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Although the last forty years of environmental law have witnessed 
some successes, they have also increasingly revealed the limitations of 
existing laws and regulatory structures.  Congress has been unable to 
pass substantial environmental legislation in recent years, 
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notwithstanding widespread recognition of the need for better tools for 
responding to climate change, toxic chemicals, non-point source water 
pollution, and other problems.1  In addition, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”) has struggled in the wake of limited 
resources and politicization to effectively use the tools it has, and its 
rulemaking processes are often dominated by industry and other repeat 
players.2  To deal with the environmental challenges we face, we must 
better account for the interests of the general public and harness the 
insights and goodwill of those outside the conventional regulatory state.  
This article proposes two mechanisms for doing so: (1) establishment of 
regulatory contrarians within the EPA to serve as a voice for 
underrepresented interests and future generations in agency proceedings; 
and (2) government sanction of environmental certification systems to 
facilitate more sustainable purchasing decisions. 
I. CHALLENGES TO THE REGULATORY STATE 
This Part highlights several of the most serious challenges 
confronting the regulatory state today.  Though these challenges are 
common among regulatory agencies, they are particularly acute at the 
EPA because of the complex and controversial subjects that the agency 
addresses. 
A. Agency Ossification and Inaction 
Regulatory agencies have been plagued by regulatory 
ossification—the increasingly slow and burdensome nature of 
rulemaking variously attributed to “hard look” judicial review as well as 
procedural requirements imposed by Congress and the executive 
branch.3  Ossification fosters excessive caution and delay in issuing 
rules, thereby frustrating statutory goals and discouraging policy 
experimentation and adaptation.4  Ossification also drains agency 
resources and pushes agencies to rely on informal policy statements 
 
 1.  See Richard N.L. Andrews, The EPA at 40: An Historical Perspective, 21 DUKE ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y F. 223, 224-25, 254 (2011). 
 2.  Id. at 253-56. 
 3.  Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse 
Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 769-72 (2006); Stephen 
M. Johnson, Ossification’s Demise? An Empirical Analysis of EPA Rulemaking from 2001-2005, 38 
ENVTL. L. 767, 774-78 (2008); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the 
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385-86 (1992). 
 4.  McGarity, supra note 3, at 1392-93. 
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rather than promulgated rules.5  In light of the scientifically taxing 
mandates often imposed upon it, the EPA is especially vulnerable to 
rulemaking delay and frustration as compared to other agencies.6  
Complaints about EPA inaction and delay were frequent during the 
George W. Bush Administration, but are not unique to that 
administration.7  Delay frequently characterizes revision of regulatory 
standards as well as initial policy making, as the EPA often misses 
statutory deadlines or fails to respond to new information or technology 
changes.8 
The difficulty of contesting agency inaction compounds the 
problem of ossification.  Judicial review of agency action is generally 
easier to obtain than judicial review of agency inaction.9  Regulatory 
beneficiaries seeking to challenge inaction may not have standing to get 
into court and, even if they can demonstrate standing, are able to 
challenge only an agency’s failure to take discrete actions that are 
mandated by law.10  Legislative oversight and industry protests are also 
more likely to focus on agency action than inaction.11  Together, these 
 
 5.  McGarity, supra note 3, at 1393-94; Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: 
Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 483, 484-89 (1997). 
 6.  Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 
181, 262-63 (1999); James W. Conrad, Jr., The Information Quality Act—Antiregulatory Costs of 
Mythic Proportions?, 12-SPG KS. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 521, 542-43 (2003) (citing comments by ABA 
Section on Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice).  The listing of hazardous air pollutants prior 
to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments and the regulation of toxic chemicals under TSCA are 
leading examples of regulatory paralysis stemming at least in part from such overly burdensome 
mandates.  See Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1613, 1668 n.200 (1995); John S. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH: Practical 
Principles for Chemical Regulation Reform, 35 ECOLOGY L. Q. 721, 766 (2008). 
 7.  Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency 
Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1378 (2013) (discussing examples where EPA “has moved slowly, or 
not at all on important risks”); Id. at 1389 (discussing EPA’s slow responses, or lack of responses, 
to rulemaking petitions); Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent 
Approach Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1381, 1384-85 (2011); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: 
The Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 118-21 
(1998). 
 8.  Lynn E. Blais & Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science, Adaptive Regulation, and the 
Problem of Rulemaking Ruts, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1715-25 (2008). 
 9.  Glen Staszewski, The Federal Inaction Commission, 59 EMORY L.J. 369, 370 (2009). 
 10.  Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004); Staszewski, supra 
note 9, at 376-77; see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An 
Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1664-75 (2004) (discussing nonreviewability and 
standing doctrines as barriers to review of agency inaction). 
 11.  Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 
1646-47 (2011). 
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“asymmetr[ies] create[] incentives for agencies to pay more attention to 
the interests and perspectives of regulated entities—and to ignore the 
views of regulatory beneficiaries—during the administrative process.”12 
B. Imbalanced Rulemaking 
Even when agencies are able to overcome the barriers and 
disincentives to action, modern rulemaking departs substantially from 
the perhaps unrealizable ideal in which stakeholders and the public work 
together with agencies to develop rules that advance the social good in a 
fair and democratically responsive way.13  As predicted by public choice 
theory, rulemaking on health and environmental matters tends to be 
dominated by regulated entities, which have the most immediately at 
stake.14  Regulated entities face far stronger incentives than regulatory 
beneficiaries to make the substantial investments in time, personnel, and 
other resources required to participate in rulemaking.  Also, regulated 
entities often have greater control of information relevant to crafting 
regulatory standards.15  The flood of information that agencies face 
further exacerbates the imbalance in favor of regulated entities, obscures 
the issues, and increases the costs of participation.16  As Professor 
Wendy Wagner has explained, environmental rulemakings that set 
industry- or product-specific standards are particularly susceptible to the 
problem of “information capture” because these proceedings necessarily 
focus on technical documentation relating to alternative compliance 
options and their cost burdens on industry.17 
Domination by regulated entities often begins before an agency 
formally proposes a rule.  In hopes of crafting rules that can withstand or 
avoid legal challenge, agencies may communicate extensively with 
regulated parties regarding their drafting.18  The matters at hand are 
often technical and complex, particularly where environmental 
regulation is at issue.  Proposals emerging from this process may be so 
 
 12.  Staszewski, supra note 9, at 371. 
 13.  This ideal reflects both a pluralist account of agency decision-making, in which the 
agency decision is seen as considering and reflecting a variety of interests, and a civic republican 
account, in which the agency decision is seen as the product of a democratically deliberative 
process.  Nina A. Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1343, 1350-51 (2011). 
 14.  Id. at 1357-58. 
 15.  Id. at 1357-58. 
 16.  Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 
DUKE L.J. 1321, 1325, 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Wagner, Administrative Law]. 
 17.  Id. at 1343-51. 
 18.  Id. at 1380-81.  
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 46 [2013], Iss. 4, Art. 8
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss4/8
VOL. 46, NO. 4 - ARTICLE 7 LIN (DO NOT DELETE) 9/19/2013  2:45 PM 
2013] POWER TO THE PEOPLE 1021 
complicated and voluminous that participation by individual members of 
the public is difficult, if not impossible.19  Indeed, even with the ease of 
electronically accessing information and transmitting comments, levels 
of citizen participation in rulemaking remain low.20  Individual citizens 
may not realize the significance of agency rulemaking, and they 
typically have little motivation to become involved in a time-consuming 
process that promises negligible personal benefit.21  Environmental 
nonprofits can play an important role in representing the interests of 
regulatory beneficiaries, but their positions and interests may differ from 
those of their members and the general public.22  Moreover, given the 
high cost of active participation in a rulemaking, nonprofits must 
selectively deploy their limited resources towards issues that are likely to 
yield the highest payoff in terms of positive publicity.23 
When individuals or public interest groups do participate in 
rulemaking, effects on substantive outcomes are often difficult to 
discern.  The idealized model of notice-and-comment rulemaking 
contemplates public input upon issuance of a proposed rule, followed by 
a thoughtful discussion and response to concerns that are raised.  
Standard rulemaking procedures, however, encourage commenters to 
take “extreme positions” and to file “one-shot attempts at persuasion.”24  
As a result, comment processes often fail to promote a meaningful 
conversation among commenters and agency officials.  Indeed, by the 
time a proposed rule is released, the agency often has already consulted 
extensively with regulated parties and is unlikely to make significant 
changes.25  To the extent that changes are made, they tend to reflect 
industry concerns rather than those of the general public.26  One 
explanation for the one-sided nature of agency changes to proposed rules 
is industry dominance of the comment process.  For example, a study of 
EPA hazardous air pollutant rulemakings found that industry 
participated in more rulemaking proceedings than public interest groups 
 
 19.  Id. at 1384-86; Mendelson, supra note 13, at 1357 (noting paucity of comments from 
ordinary citizens in several studied rulemakings).  
 20.  Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 
DUKE L.J. 943, 943 (2006). 
 21.  Id. at 965-66. 
 22.  Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 
473 (2005). 
 23.  Wagner, Administrative Law, supra note 16, at 1379, 1387.  
 24.  Cary Coglianese, Heather Kilmartin & Evan Mendelson, Transparency and Public 
Participation in the Federal Rulemaking Process: Recommendations for the New Administration, 
77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 924, 947 (2009). 
 25.  Id. at 931-32; Wagner, Administrative Law, supra note 16, at 1366. 
 26.  Wagner, Administrative Law, supra note 16, at 1387-88.  
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and filed far more comments in each proceeding.27  In addition, as 
Professor Nina Mendelson notes, “agencies appear to treat technically 
and scientifically oriented comments far more seriously than . . . value-
laden or policy-focused comments.”28  Although the latter may be just as 
relevant as the former to the rulemaking task,29 agencies perceive value-
laden comments as less likely to support a successful legal challenge.30 
Lack of meaningful public participation in agency rulemaking is 
problematic not only because participation itself is democratically 
valuable, but also because public participation can provide relevant 
information, inform decision makers of public values and preferences, 
and confer legitimacy on agency actions.31  Together, agency 
ossification, inaction, and imbalanced rulemaking processes create an 
agency that fails to act as often as it should, and that is less effective 
when it does act. 
C. The Limits of Regulation 
Finally, the government’s struggles to address environmental 
challenges suggest general limitations to the ability of conventional 
regulation alone to adequately respond to these challenges.  The “New 
Governance” school of thought recognizes the growing significance of 
non-state actors and diverse policy instruments to address public 
problems alongside or in collaboration with government.32  Broader 
governance efforts, as exemplified by voluntary regulation and 
environmental certification, can foster coordination, innovation, and 
adaptation while tapping into the energy and resources of stakeholders, 
nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”), and the public.33  At the 
same time, however, these governance mechanisms can raise serious 
 
 27.  Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical 
Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 128-29 (2011). 
 28.  Mendelson, supra note 13, at 1359. 
 29.  Id. at 1347. 
 30.  Wagner, Administrative Law, supra note 16, at 1387-88. 
 31.  Marc B. Mihaly, Citizen Participation in the Making of Environmental Decisions: 
Evolving Obstacles and Potential Solutions Through Partnership with Experts and Agents, 27 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 164-65 (2009); see also Eric Biber & Berry Brosi, Officious Intermeddlers or 
Citizen Experts? Petitions and Public Production of Information in Environmental Law, 58 UCLA 
L. REV. 321, 364-68 (2010). 
 32.  See generally Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); Lesley K. McAllister, 
Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (2012); Brad Karkkainen, “New 
Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous 
Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 474-75 (2004). 
 33.  Lobel, supra note 32, at 345, 375. 
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concerns regarding effectiveness, transparency, and accountability.  
Finding ways to put these mechanisms to good use while attending to 
such concerns is essential. 
II. THE CASE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES 
This Part proposes the establishment of new offices within the 
EPA—“environmental advocates”—to serve two critical needs 
suggested by the preceding discussion.  One type of advocate would 
represent statutory beneficiaries or underrepresented groups in 
rulemaking processes.  A second type of advocate would review the 
EPA’s performance more generally and recommend new initiatives or 
reforms to problematic processes and practices.  While patterned after 
traditional ombudsmen, these new offices would have a broader mission 
and would not be limited to responding to specific complaints. 
A. The Traditional Ombudsman 
As a government official whose function is to take positions 
contrary to government agencies, the traditional ombudsman offers a 
useful starting point for considering the design and role of the proposed 
environmental advocates.  Typically, an ombudsman is a public official 
who receives and investigates complaints regarding the conduct of 
government and makes recommendations for improving its operation.34  
The concept originated in Sweden, whose justitieombudsman was 
established by parliament to “‘supervise the observance of laws and 
statutes’ as they may be applied ‘by the courts and by public officials 
and employees.’”35  The current justitieombudsman’s powers include the 
right to make a formal note to parliament, conduct inspections, initiate 
disciplinary actions, and publish criticisms and recommendations 
regarding the operation of the government.36 
The ombudsman institution now found in many countries is tasked 
primarily with receiving, investigating, and helping to resolve individual 
citizens’ complaints regarding maladministration.37  The investigation of 
 
 34.  Ian Harden, When Europeans Complain: The Work of the European Ombudsman, 3 
CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 199, 201 (2000-2001); Mary Seneviratne, Ombudsmen 2000, 
9 NOTTINGHAM L.J. 13, 16 (2000). 
 35.  WALTER GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS: CITIZENS’ PROTECTORS IN NINE 
COUNTRIES 205 (1966) (quoting the Swedish constitution). 
 36.  Thomas Bull, The Original Ombudsman: Blueprint in Need of Revision or a Concept 
with More to Offer?, 6 EUR. PUB. L. 334, 336-37 (2000).  
 37.  Seneviratne, supra note 34, at 16; Phillip Giddings, The Ombudsman as Advocate, 4 EUR. 
Y.B. MINORITY ISSUES 207, 207-09 (2004-2005). 
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complaints by ombudsmen, moreover, can help bring systemic problems 
to the attention of agency officials, legislators, and the public.38  
Although ombudsmen in different systems vary in organization, power, 
and methods, they share several common features: independence, 
flexibility, and a lack of authority to impose a binding solution.39  This 
last feature, lack of authority, forces the ombudsman to rely upon “the 
power of report” to effectuate change.40  Ultimately, the appeal of the 
ombudsman institution stems from its flexibility, informality, and 
relatively low cost, as compared with more formal means of dispute 
resolution.41 
The United States has adopted the ombudsman concept slowly.  
Elected officials have been reluctant to allow others to intrude on the 
delivery of constituent services, and public employees have been wary 
of additional supervision.42  Nonetheless, ombudsmen can be found 
within federal, state, and local governments, as well as in quasi-public 
and private institutions.43  Examples of federal ombudsmen include the 
Taxpayer Advocate Service (“TAS”) of the Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”), which focuses on assisting taxpayers in disputes with the IRS, 
and Food and Drug Administration ombudsmen, who handle disputes 
from regulated industry regarding drug applications and the like.44 
The TAS illustrates the potential benefits of an effective 
ombudsman.  The TAS consists of 2,000 caseworkers and data analysts 
who are overseen by a national taxpayer advocate appointed by the 
Secretary of the Treasury.  The TAS’ central function is to assist in 
resolving taxpayer complaints and to serve as a check on the 
inquisitorial and highly automated system of tax administration.45  
Although the TAS may, under appropriate circumstances, issue orders to 
stay IRS enforcement against a complaining citizen, the TAS has 
generally relied instead on less coercive means to resolve disputes.46  
 
 38.  Seneviratne, supra note 34, at 19. 
 39.  Harden, supra note 34, at 201-02. 
 40.  David R. Anderson & Diane M. Stockton, Federal Ombudsman: An Underused 
Resource, 5 ADMIN. L.J. 275, 280 (1991). 
 41.  Harden, supra note 34, at 201; Seneviratne, supra note 34, at 17. 
 42.  Anderson & Stockton, supra note 40, at 278. 
 43.  Id. at 287. 
 44.  See, e.g., OMBUDSMAN 2011 ANNUAL REPORT (FDA Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & 
Research, Silver Spring, MD), at 4. 
 45.  26 U.S.C. § 7803(c) (West 2013) (establishing Office of the Taxpayer Advocate); Bryan 
Camp, What Good Is the National Taxpayer Advocate?, 126 TAX NOTES 1243, 1249 (Mar. 8, 
2010); McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1655; Elizabeth Dwoskin, Defender of Last 
Resort, BUS. WK., Apr. 9-15, 2012, at 68. 
 46.  Camp, supra note 45, at 1252-54. 
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The TAS not only handles individual cases, but also promotes policy 
reform by proposing administrative and legislative changes, issuing an 
annual report to Congress, and disseminating its research widely.47  As 
described by one commentator, the TAS’ mission is “to continually 
present the taxpayer point of view to other subcomponents within the 
agency as a balance, counterweight, or check to insular thinking and the 
enforcement mentality that often pervades inquisitorial systems.”48 
The EPA has had some limited experience with ombudsmen.  The 
1984 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) amendments 
required EPA to establish a national Office of the Ombudsman to 
receive complaints and requests for information with respect to EPA’s 
hazardous waste program.49  Although the position was statutorily 
authorized for only four years, the EPA continued the office until 2002 
as a matter of policy.  The EPA even expanded the office’s scope to 
include the Superfund program, and established regional ombudsmen as 
well.50  In its early years, the national ombudsman primarily provided 
information and addressed concerns regarding the interpretation and 
enforcement of hazardous waste regulations.51  In later years, its focus 
shifted to investigating malfeasance at Superfund cleanups.52  The 
national ombudsman office was eliminated in 2002, however, apparently 
as a result of conflict between the Office of the Ombudsman and the 
EPA administrator.53  The regional ombudsmen, which were renamed 
“Regional Public Liaisons,” continue to be responsible today for 
providing information and resolving complaints pertaining to the 
Superfund and hazardous waste programs, but their efficacy has come 
into question.54  In addition to the regional ombudsmen, an EPA small 
 
 47.  26 U.S.C. § 7803(c)(2); Camp, supra note 45, at 1254. 
 48.  Camp, supra note 45, at 1249. 
 49.  42 U.S.C. § 6917. 
 50.  GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), EPA’S NATIONAL AND REGIONAL OMBUDSMEN 
DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT INDEPENDENCE 1 (2001) [hereinafter GAO]. 
 51.  Anderson & Stockton, supra note 40, at 319-20; see generally OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN, 
OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, EPA, HAZARDOUS WASTE OMBUDSMAN 
HANDBOOK (1987). 
 52.  Whistleblower Seeks Restoration of Independent EPA Ombudsman, ENVIRONMENTAL 
NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 8, 2008, available at http://ens-newswire.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/05/2008-01-08-0951.html.  
 53.  See id. 
 54.  EPA, REGIONAL PUBLIC LIAISON PROGRAM GUIDANCE, OSWER 9200.1-106 (May 
2011) (describing duties of liaison); EPA, FY 2010 REGIONAL PUBLIC LIAISON ANNUAL REPORT, 
OSWER 9200.0-79 (2011) (reporting that two of ten liaison positions were vacant and that liaisons 
handled less than a dozen cases, including information requests); EPA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR 
GENERAL, REGIONAL PUBLIC LIAISON PROGRAM NEEDS GREATER FOCUS ON RESULTS AND 
CUSTOMER AWARENESS 6-7 (2009) (observing that implementation of liaison functions “is a 
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business ombudsman serves as a liaison in disputes between the EPA 
and small businesses, provides technical assistance to small businesses, 
and advocates for small business in EPA rulemakings.55 
The EPA’s national ombudsman office was criticized in a 
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) report for failing to satisfy 
professional standards that might have ensured its independence and 
impartiality.  Specifically, the national ombudsman was located within 
the organizational unit that it was responsible for investigating, and the 
ombudsman was subject to that unit’s budget, staffing, and supervisory 
decisions.56  The national ombudsman also did not issue an annual report 
that might have fostered accountability.57  The GAO report found EPA’s 
regional ombudsmen to be even less independent and effective, as 
employees assigned to the position divided time between their program 
function of implementing hazardous waste programs and their 
ombudsman function of investigating those same programs.58 
B. A Broader Role for Agency Outsiders: Regulatory Contrarians 
The TAS and EPA ombudsmen are traditional ombudsmen focused 
on receiving and resolving complaints by regulated parties.  This model 
of a reactive ombudsman assumes that complainants require relief from 
a heavy-handed or unresponsive bureaucracy.59  However, there are 
broader functions and roles that ombudsmen-like officials can undertake.  
Professors Brett McDonnell and Daniel Schwarcz have coined the term 
“regulatory contrarians” to generally describe entities that are “affiliated 
with, but independent of, a . . . [regulator and that have] the task of 
monitoring the regulator and the regulated marketplace and publicly 
suggesting new initiatives or potential structural or personnel 
changes.”60  Regulatory contrarians include not only traditional 
ombudsmen, but also: (1) “consumer representative contrarians” or 
“proxy advocates,” whose primary function is to represent consumers or 
the public as a class, rather than to handle individual complaints; and (2) 
“research contrarians,” who have the autonomy to produce independent 
 
collateral duty for most [liaisons]”).  EPA generally assigns employees to these positions to serve on 
a part-time basis.  GAO, supra note 50, at 16. 
 55.  Asbestos and Small Business Ombudsman, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/sbo/ (last updated 
May 16, 2012). 
 56.  GAO, supra note 50, at 2-3, 7-9. 
 57.  Id. at 3.  
 58.  Id. at 3. 
 59.  Cf. HAZARDOUS WASTE OMBUDSMAN HANDBOOK, supra note 51, at 1-1. 
 60.  McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1632-33. 
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research specifically aimed at identifying new problems for the agency 
to address.61 
1. Proxy Advocates 
A common example of a proxy advocate is the Offices of Public 
Counsel established by many states in affiliation with their public utility 
regulators.62  The California Division of Ratepayer Advocates (“DRA”), 
for example, is charged with representing the interests of public utility 
customers before the California Public Utilities Commission and other 
forums in proceedings that affect the rates, reliability, and quality of 
utility services.63  The DRA’s objective is “to obtain the lowest possible 
rate for service consistent with reliable and safe service levels,”64 and 
the DRA files pleadings in a range of formal and informal proceedings, 
including applications to raise rates, investigations, rulemakings, and 
complaints.65  At the federal level, the recent financial crisis led to the 
inclusion of similar proxy advocate mechanisms in the 2010 Dodd-Frank 
Act.  These mechanisms include a Consumer Advisory Board, a body 
composed of consumer interest advocates that advise and consult with 
the regulatory agency (the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) to 
protect consumers.  In addition there is an Investor Advisory Committee, 
which advises and consults with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission on protecting investor interests.66  These advisory bodies 
are required to meet at least twice per year and are located within the 
agencies they advise.67 
Proxy advocates are intended as a corrective to public choice 
dynamics by advocating on behalf of consumers or other diffuse groups 
who cannot adequately represent themselves before administrative 
 
 61.  Id. at 1657, 1664-65; Darryl G. Stein, Perilous Proxies: Issues of Scale for Consumer 
Representation in Agency Proceedings, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 513, 515-17 (2012).  
McDonnell and Schwarcz also identify a fourth category of regulatory contrarian: inspectors general 
and other investigative contrarians.  McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1661-64.  
 62.  McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1657-58; Stein, supra note 61, at 520-24. 
 63.  Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 309.5 (2006) (establishing office within Public Utilities 
Commission, with director to be appointed by the Governor, subject to Senate confirmation); DRA 
2011 ANNUAL REPORT (California Public Utilities Comm.), 2012, at 9. 
 64.  Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 309.5(a). 
 65.  DRA 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 63, at 9-11. 
 66.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 
11, at 1673.  In addition, prior to the elimination of the agencies in which they operated, proxy 
advocates once represented consumer interests before the Civil Aeronautics Board and Interstate 
Commerce Commission.  Stein, supra note 61, at 527-32. 
 67.  15 U.S.C. § 78pp; 12 U.S.C. § 5494; McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1673. 
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agencies, particularly in ratemaking proceedings.68  Such groups are 
generally “less able to organize, less able to participate in technical 
agency proceedings, and less likely to be heard by agency decision 
makers.”69  Historically, the need for proxy advocates was commonly 
recognized in the context of public utility regulation, where competition 
was often unavailable as a means of protecting consumers, and where 
the disparity between the participatory capacities of regulated entities 
and other interests tended to be especially large.70  Proxy advocates 
typically are tasked with addressing matters that directly implicate 
consumer welfare and that are already the subject of agency 
proceedings.71 
The institution of the proxy advocate must be carefully designed if 
it is to fulfill its intended function.  Like the agencies before which they 
appear, proxy advocates are dependent on public support and vulnerable 
to industry capture.72  Moreover, proxy advocates who represent broad 
constituencies may have to contend with conflicting obligations and 
competing constituencies, and in the process may fail to represent those 
groups most needing proxy representation.73 
2. Research Contrarians 
In addition to acting as advocates for underrepresented interests in 
agency proceedings, regulatory contrarians also may act as research 
contrarians, seeking to improve agency performance more broadly.  The 
Dodd-Frank Act creates a number of offices relating to financial reform 
that might be described as research contrarians.  For example, the Office 
of Financial Research is responsible for collecting data, identifying 
potential sources of systemic financial risk, and bringing its analyses to 
the attention of Congress and the Financial Stability Oversight Council, 
a newly created council of agency heads that must meet regularly to 
consider inadequacies of existing regulation.74  Another office, the 
Federal Insurance Office, is responsible for monitoring the insurance 
industry and “identifying issues or gaps in the regulation of insurers that 
could contribute to a systemic crisis.”75  As these examples suggest, 
 
 68.  Stein, supra note 61, at 515; McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1658. 
 69.  Stein, supra note 61, at 533. 
 70.  Id. at 522-23. 
 71.  McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1658, 1660. 
 72.  Stein, supra note 61, at 546. 
 73.  Id. at 548-49. 
 74.  McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1670, 1674-75. 
 75.  31 U.S.C. § 313(c)(1)(A) (West 2013); McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1671. 
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research contrarians have the leeway to investigate incipient problems 
and recommend administrative or legislative responses to those 
problems. 
C. Proposal: A Public Advocate and a Reform Advocate at the EPA 
What sort of regulatory contrarians would improve the EPA’s 
effectiveness and representativeness?  As discussed in Part I, rulemaking 
processes suffer from a large disparity in participation and influence as 
between regulated entities and the public.  This fact suggests the 
potential value of a proxy advocate who can represent the interests of the 
general public and counter the influence of regulated entities before and 
after a rule is proposed.  For example, such an official, whom we might 
call a “public advocate,” could raise concerns about overlooked public 
health benefits and submit comments and data for the agency (and any 
reviewing courts) to consider.76  The proxy advocate might also choose 
to participate in proceedings other than rulemakings, such as permitting 
decisions, though its efforts should generally focus on agency action 
having the greatest scope and effect. 
Underrepresentation is not the only need that a regulatory 
contrarian could address.  The breakdown of the rulemaking process 
means that the EPA is not undertaking initiatives—whether in the form 
of rulemaking, rule enforcement, or otherwise—that it has the authority 
to undertake.  In addition, the pace of technological and societal change, 
combined with the dynamic threat of climate change, suggests the utility 
of an early warning function that would alert the EPA and the public to 
emerging environmental threats or developments.77  In short, there is a 
need for an official who could carry out the functions of a research 
contrarian, whom we might term a “reform advocate.”  An EPA reform 
advocate would have broad discretion to study issues relevant to the 
EPA’s regulatory functions, including but not limited to problems with 
existing regulatory processes.78 
A number of institutional design issues should be considered with 
respect to designing the proposed EPA advocate offices.  Independence 
and persuasive authority will be critical for any contrarian, whether a 
 
 76.  Wagner, Administrative Law, supra note 16, at 1414-15. 
 77.  Cf. David Rejeski, The Molecular Economy, 27 ENVTL. FORUM 1, Jan./Feb. 2010, at 40-
41 (proposing “establishment of a high-level Early Warning Officer”); McDonnell & Schwarcz, 
supra note 11, at 1635 (contending that contrarian institutions “can improve the capacity of 
regulators to adapt to changing market conditions and structures”). 
 78.  Cf. McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1664-67 (discussing research contrarians). 
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research contrarian or proxy advocate.79  Ultimately, the offices should 
be designed to promote the essential characteristics of independence, 
credibility, and representation. 
1. Independence 
An effective contrarian must be independent of the EPA, willing to 
publicize the agency’s failings and take positions contrary to EPA 
officials and staff.  The ombudsman literature suggests several factors 
that can affect the office’s independence, including qualifications, 
method of appointment, funding, and placement.80 
Requiring that the proposed EPA advocates have a minimum 
amount of expertise and other qualifications can reduce the risk that the 
advocates will be overly political.81  At the same time, the positions 
should not be defined so narrowly as to eliminate candidates who would 
bring an outsider perspective to the office.  The TAS’ national taxpayer 
advocate, for example, must have “a background in customer service as 
well as tax law” and “experience in representing taxpayers,” but cannot 
have worked for the IRS for two years prior to appointment.82  Similarly, 
the EPA advocates should be required to have a background in 
environmental advocacy and environmental law or policy and should be 
made subject to similar employment restrictions. 
For many state-level public utility proxy advocates, appointment by 
the executive or a lower-level executive official is common.83  
Regulatory contrarians can also be appointed by the legislature or by a 
commission.  Appointment of the EPA advocates by the EPA 
administrator would be far from ideal; such advocates may be reluctant 
to criticize the administrator or the EPA.  One advantage of such an 
arrangement, however, is that it could be set up administratively and 
would require no congressional action.84  It thus may offer the most 
realistic option for establishing some sort of contrarian at the EPA in the 
present political climate.  Greater independence for the EPA advocates 
might be provided through presidential or other high-level appointment, 
 
 79.  Id. at 1645-46. 
 80.  McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1679-80; Anderson & Stockton, supra note 
40, at 335-41; Stein, supra note 61, at 551-58. 
 81.  Stein, supra note 61, at 553. 
 82.  26 U.S.C. § 7803(c)(1) (West 2013).  The advocate is also prohibited from working for 
the IRS for at least five years after leaving the office.  Id. 
 83.  Stein, supra note 61, at 556. 
 84.  Cf. Anderson & Stockton, supra note 40, at 335 (noting in 1991 that most federal 
ombudsmen were created by agency order).  An administratively created advocate could also be 
administratively eliminated, of course. 
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as suggested by the national taxpayer advocate’s appointment by the 
Secretary of the Treasury.  Such an arrangement would not necessarily 
guarantee independence, however, as the advocates and the EPA 
administrator, having been appointed by the same person, could well 
share similar views.85  Establishment and appointment of the advocates 
by the legislature (or one of its subcommittees), would be consistent 
with the traditional ombudsman model and more likely to promote 
independence.86  However, too great a level of independence may limit 
the advocates’ ability to persuade the EPA.  Perhaps a hybrid approach 
would be preferable, in which the president appoints each advocate from 
a list of candidates approved by a congressional committee, or in which 
a congressional committee selects candidates identified by the president.  
Alternatively, a non-legislative commission composed of public officials 
and private citizens could identify qualified candidates for presidential 
selection.  These latter options all separate the functions of nomination 
and appointment and thus would tend to promote a neutral selection 
process.87 
Funding to ensure independent advocates presents another difficult 
question of institutional design.  On the one hand, funding through the 
EPA would leave the advocates subject to EPA control, as experience 
with the EPA’s RCRA ombudsman demonstrates.88  Direct budget 
appropriations from the legislature would offer independence from the 
EPA, but would also subject the advocates to annual budgetary battles.  
Independent advocates are not likely to have strong defenders in the 
budgeting process, and consequently would be vulnerable to 
underfunding or elimination.  Ideally, the advocates would be supported 
by a dedicated and distinct source of funding, which would promote 
their independence.  State proxy advocates are often supported through 
fee levies on regulated entities, and a similar levy could be used to 
support the EPA advocates. 
The placement of regulatory contrarians within the bureaucracy 
also affects their independence.  As noted earlier, the independence of 
EPA’s national ombudsman was compromised by its placement within 
the organization it was responsible for investigating.  At the state level, 
 
 85.  Cf. McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1658 (discussing Texas Office of Public 
Insurance Counsel, who is appointed by governor). 
 86.  William B. Gwyn, Transferring the Ombudsman, in OMBUDSMEN FOR AMERICAN 
GOVERNMENT? 37, 46-48 (Stanley V. Anderson, ed., 1968). 
 87.  INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, UNIV. OF CALIF., BERKELEY, ESTABLISHING 
OMBUDSMAN OFFICES: RECENT EXPERIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 25 (Stanley V. Anderson & 
John E. Moore eds., 1972). 
 88.  Stein, supra note 61, at 557 (equating budgetary authority with overall control). 
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proxy advocates can be found in various locations within the executive 
branch: within the regulatory agency, but in a different division; within 
the attorney general’s office or an agency other than the one it is charged 
with investigating; or as a freestanding agency.89  Placement outside the 
agency generally promotes independence, but also creates a distance that 
can foster distrust and undermine the contrarian’s effectiveness.90  A 
balance between these competing interests might be struck by 
establishing the advocates as a separate division within the EPA, distinct 
from the programmatic offices whose work they will be evaluating.91  
Such an arrangement would foster some degree of independence, while 
encouraging information sharing and relationships that can bring about 
beneficial reforms. 
2. Persuasive Authority 
Lacking the authority to compel an agency to adopt a particular 
course of action, regulatory contrarians must instead rely on their ability 
to persuade.92  A contrarian’s persuasive authority derives from its 
credibility as well as its capacity to attract the attention of agency 
officials and influential forces outside the agency.  To be credible, a 
contrarian must be respected and well-qualified.  Ideally, the 
appointment process would produce such contrarians.  The selection of a 
respected contrarian is especially critical when the office of the 
advocate—and its reputation—is initially being established.93  
Moreover, a contrarian’s arguments must be well-informed.  
Accordingly, the EPA advocates should have access to the information, 
practices, and culture of the agency and relevant environmental 
problems.94  Each advocate will have to rely heavily on the EPA’s 
expertise and information-gathering ability, but should also have a 
modest expert staff of its own that can reassess and supplement the 
EPA’s work.  The separate staff, along with the advocate’s outsider 
 
 89.  Id. at 554-55. 
 90.  Anderson & Stockton, supra note 40, at 339.  With respect to the TAS, for example, staff 
once rotated between functions as TAS and IRS employees.  The clear separation of the two 
organizations subsequently mandated by Congress has eliminated the opportunity for IRS 
employees to experience and incorporate a more taxpayer-friendly view and “expanded potential for 
mutual distrust.”  Camp, supra note 45, at 1250. 
 91.  EPA’s programmatic offices include the Office of Air and Radiation, Office of Solid 
Waste and Emergency Response, and Office of Water.  See About EPA, EPA 
http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/organization.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2013). 
 92.  McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1652. 
 93.  INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 87, at 11, 14. 
 94.  McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 1648. 
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status, will promote an independent perspective that will contribute to 
the advocate’s persuasive power, particularly outside the agency.  
Finally, the advocates can persuade by bringing outside pressure on the 
agency to consider their arguments and to respond to their concerns.  
Giving the EPA advocates access to the EPA administrator, White 
House officials, legislators, and media, along with the authority to speak 
publicly and issue public reports, will be essential to their 
empowerment.95 
3. Representation 
The purpose of having a proxy advocate would be to ensure 
representation in agency processes for those requiring it most.  Similarly, 
a research contrarian’s function would be to give voice to unarticulated 
views.  But who are those most needing such representation?  One 
candidate is nature, whose interest is often defended by environmental 
groups, but which of course cannot speak for itself.  Similarly, future 
generations would benefit from an official representative to articulate 
their interests.  In either instance, however, the political viability of such 
an advocate would be doubtful because there would exist no direct 
constituency to defend its work.  A more politically feasible possibility 
would be for the EPA advocates to represent the general public.  The 
general public may present too broad a class to be effectively 
represented by a single advocate, however, due to its multiple and 
potentially conflicting interests.  Defining the potential group to be 
represented too broadly can confuse a proxy advocate’s objective and 
leave diffuse interests at a disadvantage.96 
There are several options for narrowing the interests that the 
advocates are to represent.  One possibility would be to identify 
subpopulations that are systematically underrepresented in the political 
process and agency proceedings, and to assign an advocate to 
specifically represent those subpopulations.  For example, an advocate 
might be tasked with representing vulnerable populations or raising 
environmental justice concerns.97  This approach has the advantage of 
being fairly straightforward, and it would be relatively easy to determine 
if the advocate strays from its defined mission.  Another possibility 
would be to define an advocate’s role in rulemaking proceedings by 
 
 95.  Id. at 1645. 
 96.  Stein, supra note 61, at 549. 
 97.  Cf. Wagner, Administrative Law, supra note 16, at 1414-15 (suggesting appointment of 
advocates to scrutinize rulemakings on behalf of missing interests). 
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looking first to the provisions on which a proposed rule is based to 
identify a statute’s intended beneficiaries, and then comparing those 
beneficiaries with rulemaking participants to identify those interests 
needing representation.  For example, in a proceeding to revise ambient 
air quality standards under Section 109 of the Clean Air Act, the 
advocate’s job would be to ensure adequate representation of public 
health and welfare interests throughout the process.  While such a 
mechanism would tailor representation to particular proceedings, it 
could be somewhat cumbersome to administer and would involve a 
significant amount of discretion.  Moreover, outside of rulemakings—as 
in the case of the reform advocate—the advocate’s role is less subject to 
easy definition.  A final option would be to have the EPA advocates 
accept suggestions from the public or from a diverse committee 
regarding matters meriting further attention, and to allow the advocates 
broad discretion in deciding where additional representation is needed.98  
Excessively broad discretion would be vulnerable to abuse, however, 
and would leave the advocates especially at risk of capture by regulated 
interests. 
III. THE CASE FOR A PUBLIC ROLE IN ENVIRONMENTAL CERTIFICATION 
Neither a more vigorous EPA nor vigorous advocacy by regulatory 
contrarians within the EPA will be enough to address our environmental 
challenges.  Government resources and public support for traditional 
forms of oversight are limited.  In addition, such oversight may not be 
politically or practically feasible for regulating the individual behaviors 
that are contributing significantly to environmental problems ranging 
from biodiversity loss to climate change.99  Efforts to protect the 
environment must embrace collaborative and multi-party governance.100 
 
 98.  Use of an advisory committee would be comparable to the Investor Advisory Committee 
created by Dodd-Frank, which includes an Investor Advocate (an official with ombudsman duties 
comparable to the Taxpayer Advocate), as well as representatives of state governments, senior 
citizens, and individual and institutional investors.  15 U.S.C. § 78pp(b); McDonnell & Schwarcz, 
supra note 11, at 1673. 
 99.  See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm 
Activation Can Protect the Environment, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1101 (2005); JASON J. CZARNESKI, 
EVERYDAY ENVIRONMENTALISM: LAW, NATURE, AND INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR (2010); J.B. Ruhl, 
Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. 
L. 363, 423-25 (2010). 
 100.  Ruhl, supra note 99, at 425; see generally Lobel, supra note 32, at 371-404. 
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A. The Promise of Environmental Certification 
One important multi-party governance tool for influencing 
individual behaviors is environmental certification, the use of which has 
risen dramatically in recent years.101  Companies and nonprofit 
organizations issue hundreds of environmental labels worldwide, 
covering food, forest products, and numerous other items.102  In the 
United States, companies desiring to label the carbon content of their 
products can choose from more than ten voluntary certification 
programs.103  The growing popularity of environmental certification 
reflects the fact that many consumers deem a product’s environmental 
attributes to be relevant to their purchasing decisions.104  In addition, the 
development of voluntary certification programs has enabled public and 
private actors to adopt procurement and permitting policies that favor 
more sustainable goods and services.105  Ultimately, well-designed 
environmental certification processes can encourage environmentally 
beneficial product substitution, improve production practices, and 
promote green innovation.106 
Voluntary environmental certification programs are unlikely to 
influence the operations of environmental laggards and cannot substitute 
for traditional government regulation.107  Moreover, the broader effects 
of these programs in promoting sustainability can be difficult to 
measure.108  But like regulatory contrarians, environmental certification 
schemes can complement traditional regulation, shift “power to the 
people,” and help to achieve outcomes that better reflect the public 
interest.  The mechanisms by which regulatory contrarians and 
 
 101.  TERRACHOICE, THE SINS OF GREENWASHING: HOME AND FAMILY EDITION 2010 (2010). 
 102.  STEERING COMMITTEE OF THE STATE-OF-KNOWLEDGE ASSESSMENT OF STANDARDS AND 
CERTIFICATION, TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY: THE ROLES AND LIMITATIONS OF CERTIFICATION ES-4 
(2012); Juliet Eilperin, Environmental Certification Becoming Increasingly Crowded and Contested 
Field, WASH. POST, May 3, 2010, at A4. 
 103.  Jessica E. Fliegelman, The Next Generation of Greenwash: Diminishing Consumer 
Confusion Through a National Eco-Labeling Program, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1001, 1045 (2010). 
 104.  WORLD RESOURCES INST., 2010 GLOBAL ECOLABEL MONITOR: TOWARDS 
TRANSPARENCY 3 (2010); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Thomas Dietz & Paul C. Stern, Time to Try 
Carbon Labelling, 1 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 4, 5 (2011).  
 105.  TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 102, at ES-9. 
 106.  Vandenbergh, Dietz & Stern, supra note 104, at 4-5; TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra 
note 102, at ES-6. 
 107.  TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 102, at ES-14. 
 108.  Id. at ES-6 (noting paucity of empirical evidence on whether certification drives large-
scale changes in favor of sustainability); Ralph E. Horne, Limits to Labels: The Role of Eco-Labels 
in the Assessment of Product Sustainability and Routes to Sustainable Consumption, 33 INT’L J. 
CONSUMER STUD. 175, 179-80 (2009). 
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environmental certification systems operate are very different, of course.  
Regulatory contrarians are proxies that stand for the interests of 
underrepresented groups in regulatory proceedings.  In contrast, 
environmental certification empowers consumers to express their 
preferences about production processes and environmental practices 
directly through market transactions.109  While it would be erroneous to 
equate the preferences expressed in such transactions with choices made 
through democratic political processes, marketplace decisions 
undoubtedly have environmental impacts. 
B. Private Certification 
The private sector dominates environmental certification in the 
United States.  Private certification allows the market to respond to 
consumer demand for green products.  In addition, competing labels 
presumably can offer producers a range of certification options of 
varying stringency.  Although certifiers conceivably could reach a 
consensus regarding appropriate criteria for certification, the 
proliferation of environmental certification schemes—and the varying 
standards the schemes apply—suggest a lack of consensus.110  The sheer 
number of certifications engenders consumer confusion regarding the 
meaning and significance of eco-labels.111  Exacerbating this confusion, 
the source of a label is often unclear because certification-like labels can 
be obtained with little or no testing by merely paying a fee.112  
Confusion diminishes the information value of labeling and contributes 
to overall consumer skepticism towards environmental marketing 
claims.113  To the extent consumers are unable to distinguish between 
certifications, consumer confusion reduces the attractiveness of more 
 
 109.  Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the 
Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 624 (2004) (“process preferences instead 
offer an important vehicle through which individuals influence the world, express their views on 
public issues, and fashion their moral identity”). 
 110.  Fliegelman, supra note 103, at 1045-46 (discussing private environmental certification). 
 111.  Norm Borin et al., Consumer Effects of Environmental Impact in Product Labeling, 28 J. 
CONSUMER MARKETING 76, 76 (2011); NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POLICY SOLUTIONS, DUKE 
UNIVERSITY, AN OVERVIEW OF ECOLABELS AND SUSTAINABILITY CERTIFICATIONS IN THE GLOBAL 
MARKETPLACE 10 (Jay S. Golden, ed., Oct. 2010) [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF ECOLABELS AND 
SUSTAINABILITY CERTIFICATIONS]. 
 112.  Rick Harbaugh, John Maxwell & Beatrice Roussillon, Label Confusion: The Groucho 
Effect of Uncertain Standards, 57 MANAGEMENT SCI. 1512, 1513 (2011); It’s Too Easy Being 
Green: Defining Fair Green Marketing Practices, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Commerce, 
Trade, and Consumer Protection, 111th Cong. 1st Sess. 2, 22 (2009) (statement of Hon. Bobby L. 
Rush, a representative in congress from the state of Illinois).  
 113.  Harbaugh, Maxwell & Roussillon, supra note 112, at 1513.  
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rigorous labeling schemes and creates incentives for certification 
organizations to water down their standards.114  Competing businesses 
and certification systems sometimes do draw attention to the weaknesses 
of certifications used or developed by rivals.115  Similarly, NGOs may 
try to sort through the confusion on consumers’ behalf or pressure 
businesses to use more stringent certifications.116  Nonetheless, 
consumers are confronted with a bewildering array of eco-labels. 
Credibility, transparency, and accountability concerns also surround 
private certification systems.117  Consumers generally cannot determine 
directly whether a product was produced in an environmentally friendly 
manner and must rely on certifiers to monitor environmental attributes 
for them.118  Therefore, credibility is essential to the success of 
environmental certification.119  If a certification is not credible, 
consumers will not be willing to pay a premium for certified products.  
The credibility of many environmental certifications is subject to doubt, 
however, not only because of consumer confusion, but also because 
producers typically pay for third-party certification.120  In the absence of 
truly independent certifiers or independent oversight of certification 
systems, consumers have good reason to be skeptical. 
Transparency can be a powerful means of bolstering credibility and 
countering pressures to weaken certification criteria.121  Consumers or 
other third parties with access to information on certifiers’ finances, 
evaluation criteria, and monitoring processes, can assess the credibility 
of certification schemes for themselves.  Unfortunately, many 
certification schemes suffer from a lack of transparency. For example, 
one study found over half of eco-labeling organizations “unreachable, 
difficult to reach, or uncooperative when asked about core metrics.”122  
 
 114.  Jamie A. Grodsky, Certified Green: The Law and Future of Environmental Labeling, 10 
YALE J. REG. 147, 213 (1993). 
 115.  Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: the Case 
of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 47, 80 (2006) [hereinafter Meidinger, Administrative Law].  
 116.  Id. at 77.  
 117.  McAllister, supra note 32, at 5.  
 118.  John M. Crespi & Stephan Marette, Eco-Labelling Economics: Is Public Involvement 
Necessary?, in ENVIRONMENT, INFORMATION AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 93, 96-97 (Signe Krarup 
& Clifford S. Russell, eds., 2005). 
 119.  Grodsky, supra note 114, at 211. 
 120.  Id. at 209-10; Errol E. Meidinger, The New Environmental Law: Forest Certification, 10 
BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 277, 284 (2002-03) [hereinafter Meidinger, New Environmental Law] 
(suggesting that certifiers “are in effect public fiduciaries employed by the very private actors 
whose activities they are supposed to assess and monitor”). 
 121.  Grodsky, supra note 114, at 213; Harbaugh, Maxwell & Roussillon, supra note 112, at 
1513. 
 122.  WORLD RESOURCES INST., supra note 104, at 14. 
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Information on certification inspections tends to be especially sparse, 
shrouded in concerns that confidential business information might be 
revealed.123 
Transparency, moreover, is a critical element of accountability and 
legitimacy.124  These qualities matter because certification schemes can 
influence formal legal mandates and serve as a form of regulation.125  
Namely, these schemes set standards, determine compliance with those 
standards, and sanction noncompliance.126  As a form of governance, 
certification systems have a responsibility to society at large and to 
affected interests.  Ultimately, private certification systems vary in the 
extent to which they engage industry members, governments, NGOs, 
and consumers.127  Yet in contrast to government regulators, certifiers 
are not accountable—directly or indirectly—to the electorate. 
C. The Government and Environmental Certification 
1. Present Involvement 
The federal government presently provides environmental 
certifications in limited areas.128  Perhaps most familiar is the Energy 
Star program, under which the EPA offers an “Energy Star” designation 
for appliances, office equipment, new residential buildings, and various 
other products meeting specified energy efficiency standards.129  
Similarly, the EPA’s Water Sense designation recognizes water-using 
products meeting EPA-determined efficiency and performance 
criteria.130  For both programs, participation is voluntary, specifications 
are developed with stakeholder input and public comment, and an 
 
 123.  Meidinger, Administrative Law, supra note 115, at 81.  
 124.  Errol E. Meidinger, Environmental Certification Programs and U.S. Environmental Law: 
Closer Than You May Think, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,162, 10,164 (2001) [hereinafter Meidinger, 
Environmental Certification] (characterizing public access to information as “the most important 
mechanism for protecting the legitimacy of government regulatory agencies in the modern era”). 
 125.  Meidinger, supra note 124, at 10,165-66, 10,176 (“certification programs perform public 
functions”). 
 126.  Forest certification, for example, has been described as “a transnational, rule-oriented 
system made up of competing, mutually adjusting organizations and institutions.”  Meidinger, 
Administrative Law, supra note 115, at 60. 
 127.  TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 102, at ES-13; Meidinger, Administrative Law, 
supra note 115, at 82-83.  
 128.  See Mary Ann Mullin & Daniel J. Deeb, Policing of Green Claims, NAT. RES. & ENV’T, 
Spring 2012, at 28, 29.  
 129.  McAllister, supra note 32, at 18-19. 
 130.  Water Sense: General Questions, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/watersense/general.html (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2012). 
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independent third party certifies products.131  Importantly, both programs 
are product-based schemes that focus narrowly on one environmental 
impact from use—i.e., energy consumption in the case of Energy Star, 
and water consumption in the case of Water Sense—rather than on 
overall environmental impacts over the life cycle of a product.132 
Beyond such programs, government involvement is largely limited 
to Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) policing of the market for 
deceptive practices.  Since 1992, FTC guidelines, known as the Green 
Guides, have assisted marketers in avoiding misleading environmental 
marketing claims by suggesting practices that qualify for safe harbors 
against prosecution.133  The Green Guides have focused primarily on the 
use of specific language regarding the environmental characteristics of a 
product or production process.134  However, the Green Guides do not 
constitute binding rules.  In addition, the FTC has brought relatively few 
enforcement actions against green washing, and it has expressed a 
reluctance to engage in setting environmental standards.135 
The FTC’s recent revisions to the Green Guides for the first time 
specifically address claims relating to environmental certifications.136  
The revisions state that a third-party certification may constitute an 
endorsement, and as such, must reflect the endorser’s honest opinion.137  
They also recommend that certifications be accompanied by clear 
language explaining the specific environmental benefits that have been 
substantiated.138  In addition, marketers who rely on third-party 
certification must ensure that the certification adequately substantiates 
the marketer’s claims.139  Notably, in revising the Green Guides, the 
FTC did not propose the establishment of a particular certification 
system, or even guidance on the development of third-party certification 
programs.  Thus, while the revisions may curb the making of 
 
 131.  Id.; EPA, ENERGY STAR AND OTHER CLIMATE PROTECTION PARTNERSHIPS: 2010 
ANNUAL REPORT (2011).  EPA implemented third-party certification for the Energy Star program 
beginning in 2011.  Id. at 17.   
 132.  Jeffrey J. Minneti, Relational Integrity Regulation: Nudging Consumers Toward 
Products Bearing Valid Environmental Marketing Claims, 40 ENVTL. L. 1327, 1353 (2010). 
 133.  Federal Trade Commission, Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 77 
FED. REG. 62,122 (2012); Minneti, supra note 132, at 1345-46. 
 134.  See generally 16 C.F.R. § Part 260. 
 135.  Fliegelman, supra note 103, at 1042-43; Richard Dahl, Greenwashing: Do You Know 
What You’re Buying?, 118 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A246, A248 (2010). 
 136.  Federal Trade Commission, Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 77 
FED. REG. 62,122 (2012).   
 137.  Id. at 62,126-27 (setting out 16 C.F.R. § 260.6). 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. (setting out 16 C.F.R. § 260.6(c)). 
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unsubstantiated claims, they are unlikely to reduce consumer confusion 
or ensure real environmental benefits.140 
2. Potential Benefits of Further Involvement 
Greater government involvement in environmental certification can 
address many of the concerns that surround private certification.141  Such 
involvement might simply take the form of stepped-up policing of 
private certification programs.  Alternatively, the government might 
directly set standards, certify that processes and products meet those 
standards, accredit certifiers, or select a board of directors to operate a 
certification program.142  Although stepped-up policing of private 
certifiers may discourage green washing and increase transparency, 
more direct government participation will likely be necessary to reduce 
consumer confusion effectively.  Accreditation of private certification 
systems can reduce credibility concerns by ensuring that certifiers are 
independent of the companies whose products are being certified.  In a 
market where multiple standards are overwhelming consumers, 
government sanction can create a “focal” standard having clearly 
defined requirements that would restore much of the information value 
of labeling.143  The Energy Star program provides one illustration of a 
government standard that has attracted considerable participation from 
major manufacturers, while gaining broad public recognition and 
confidence.144  Indeed, a focal standard may be valuable even if 
consumers are not aware of the precise criteria underlying it.  Consumers 
may come to expect that the standard be met, and they may draw 
 
 140.  Cf. Maria Savasta-Kennedy, The Newest Hybrid: Notes Toward Standardized 
Certification of Carbon Offsets, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 851, 870-71 (2009) 
(characterizing role of FTC Green Guides as no more than “supplemental” in policing carbon 
offsets). 
 141.  Grodsky, supra note 114, at 206. 
 142.  Meidinger, Administrative Law, supra note 115, at 60 (discussing components of 
certification systems); Grodsky, supra note 114, at 207-08 (sketching out hybrid model of 
certification). 
 143.  Harbaugh, Maxwell & Roussillon, supra note 112, at 1520; Crespi & Marette, supra note 
118, at 101. 
 144.  OVERVIEW OF ECOLABELS AND SUSTAINABILITY CERTIFICATIONS, supra note 111, at 34.  
In response to a 2010 Government Accountability Office investigation that sharply criticized 
Energy Star’s reliance on self-certification, the government instituted a requirement that products 
seeking certification be tested in approved, independent labs.  Sonja Ryst, U.S. Agencies Try to 
Restore Faith in Energy Star Appliance Testing, WASH. POST, July 10, 2010, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/08/AR2010070806804.html.  
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ENERGY STAR PROGRAM: COVERT TESTING SHOWS THE 
ENERGY STAR PROGRAM CERTIFICATION PROCESS IS VULNERABLE TO FRAUD AND ABUSE (2010). 
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negative inferences about products that only obtain alternative 
certifications.145 
Government involvement also can alleviate other difficulties 
associated with purely private certification.  A government-run program 
can provide greater accountability because it would be subject to public 
disclosure requirements and ultimately responsible to the public.146  
Government certification programs also tend to incorporate concerns of 
a wider range of stakeholders.147  Finally, government support can foster 
financial stability and long-term viability.148  An examination of 
certification programs worldwide found those with significant 
government involvement to have generally higher levels of market 
penetration.149 
The U.S. organic food labeling program and Germany’s Blue Angel 
environmental certification scheme illustrate the potential benefits of 
government involvement in certification.  U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (“USDA”) implementation of national standards for organic 
food has spurred dramatic growth in the organic market and led to 
widespread acceptance of the organic label.150  Central to the program’s 
success has been the reduction of consumer confusion regarding the 
meaning of the term “organic,” which had been plagued with misleading 
claims prior to creation of the government program.151  Although the 
program has been criticized for ignoring the organic movement’s vision 
of small-scale production, humane practices, and environmental 
stewardship,152 the program undoubtedly has achieved its aims of 
reducing confusion and satisfying consumer demand for foods produced 
with fewer chemicals. 
Germany’s Blue Angel program similarly suggests benefits from 
government certification.  Created in 1978, Blue Angel is the oldest 
environmental certification system in the world.  Under the program, the 
German environmental agency helps to formulate technical criteria for 
certification.  An “environmental label jury” composed of 
 
 145.  Harbaugh, Maxwell & Roussillon, supra note 112, at 1520.   
 146.  Grodsky, supra note 114, at 206 (suggesting that a purely governmental program would 
be subject to the Administrative Procedure Act). 
 147.  Id.; Horne, supra note 108, at 179. 
 148.  OVERVIEW OF ECOLABELS AND SUSTAINABILITY CERTIFICATIONS, supra note 111, at 36. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. at 31, 33; Jason J. Czarneski, The Future of Food Eco-Labeling: Organic, Carbon 
Footprint, and Environmental Life-Cycle Analysis, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 14-15 (2011). 
 151.  Fliegelman, supra note 103, at 1025-26. 
 152.  J. Heckman, A History of Organic Farming: Transitions from Sir Albert Howard’s War 
in the Soil to USDA National Organic Program, 21 RENEWABLE AGRICULTURE & FOOD SYSTEMS 
143, 148 (2006). 
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representatives from industry, consumer and environmental groups, 
unions, and other interests approves and applies the criteria.153  The 
environmental minister primarily appoints jury representatives.  The jury 
is responsible not only for choosing recipients of the certification, but 
also for determining the product groups eligible for labeling.154  The 
Blue Angel eco-label is widely recognized in Germany, and consumers 
value its independence.155 
None of this is to suggest that government certification systems are 
flawless.  Wary of certification standards that can be satisfied by only a 
few of its members, industry will pressure government-run certification 
programs to generate watered-down standards.156  Industry may come to 
dominate the establishment of governmental certification standards, just 
as it has come to dominate rulemaking processes.  The credibility of 
government certification may come into question if the government is 
perceived as having close ties to industry.157  In addition, a wholly 
governmental certification system would surely involve significant start-
up and administrative costs.158  In contrast to the Energy Star and Water 
Sense programs, which focus narrowly on a single, readily testable 
product characteristic, a comprehensive environmental certification 
program would have to analyze production processes as well as multiple 
product characteristics. 
Ultimately, these concerns suggest the value of a hybrid approach 
that incorporates both the government and the private sector.  
Government oversight can provide credibility and ensure that minimum 
standards for transparency and accountability are met.  At the same time, 
leaving the administration of certification programs to independent 
private actors can provide insulation against industry pressure, allow 
greater flexibility, and reduce administrative costs.159  The potential 
value of having broad stakeholder participation in implementing a 
certification program, as in the Blue Angel program, is reflected by a 
study finding that consumers trust consumer and environmental 
 
 153.  The Blue Angel—The Reliable Label, THE BLUE ANGEL: ENV’T LABEL JURY, 
http://www.blauer-engel.de/en/blauer_engel/whats_behind_it/the_reliable_label.php (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2012). 
 154.  Environmental Label Jury, THE BLUE ANGEL: ENV’T LABEL JURY, http://www.blauer-
engel.de/en/blauer_engel/who_is_behind_it/environmental_label_jury.php (last visited Sept. 5, 
2012). 
 155.  Horne, supra note 108, at 176. 
 156.  Grodsky, supra note 114, at 206. 
 157.  Crespi & Marette, supra note 118, at 100. 
 158.  Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 140, at 883. 
 159.  Grodsky, supra note 114, at 208; Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 140, at 883. 
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organizations the most to produce a credible eco-label.160 
D. Proposal: Government Accreditation of Environmental 
Certification 
Under a hybrid approach, government involvement in 
environmental certification systems could take a variety of forms.  The 
government could step up its policing of green claims, with the EPA 
playing a lead role in defining the terms used by green marketers.  An 
effective policing effort would require the government to expend 
substantial resources, however, in testing products and examining supply 
chains and production processes.  A more prominent yet less demanding 
government role might involve regulation of the procedures followed by 
certification programs.  The government might, for example, mandate 
information disclosure or public participation.161  In light of the 
importance of transparency in enabling citizens and third parties to 
interpret eco-labels and to monitor the certification process,162 requiring 
transparency in the development and application of standards is 
essential.  However, because neither this approach nor stepped-up 
policing would create a focal standard, the consumer confusion would 
likely persist. 
Perhaps the most promising means of generating a focal standard 
would be to establish a government program that would officially 
accredit certification systems already in existence.  Although such an 
approach might be attacked for favoring a small group of certifiers, it 
would require the creation of only minimal new infrastructure.  One 
precedent for sanctioning existing certification systems involves 
Underwriters Laboratories (“UL”), a nonprofit organization engaged in 
product safety certification.  Initially funded by the insurance 
industry,163 UL is one of a handful of certifiers that the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) has accredited to provide 
the testing and certification required by many of OSHA’s safety 
standards.164  In deciding whether to accredit UL or any other certifier, 
OSHA considers a certifier’s independence, ability to perform testing, 
control procedures, use of inspections to evaluate products and monitor 
 
 160.  Renate Gertz, Eco-Labelling-A Case for Deregulation?, 4 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 
127, 136 (2005). 
 161.  Meidinger, Environmental Certification, supra note 124, at 10,175. 
 162.  Meidinger, New Environmental Law, supra note 120, at 285. 
 163.  Grodsky, supra note 114, at 212. 
 164.  Tom Lookabaugh, Patrick Ryan & Douglas C. Sicker, A Model for Emergency Service of 
VOIP Through Certification and Labeling, 58 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 115, 127 (2006). 
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proper use of the certifier’s mark, and procedures for producing 
objective findings and handling complaints.165  The EPA could consider 
similar factors in awarding a government seal to environmental 
certifiers.  The EPA might also identify relevant environmental criteria 
and develop substantive standards that certifiers would be expected to 
apply.  These standards, on the one hand, could be quite general—for 
example, recognizing no more than twenty percent of a market as the top 
performers with respect to an environmental criterion.  On the other 
hand, the standards could be quite specific.  For example, they could 
require consideration of carbon footprints or preclude certification for 
products that use or contain designated highly toxic substances.  Such 
standards would help ensure that certifications actually promote 
sustainability, climate change mitigation, or other desired goals. 
Alternatively, the government could set up a new certification 
program blending government direction with private implementation.  
Such a program might take a form similar to the proposed Eco-Labeling 
Act of 2008, which was circulated but never officially endorsed by 
Senator Dianne Feinstein.166  That proposal was patterned in part after 
the organic food-labeling program, which requires organic operations to 
be certified by third parties accredited by the USDA.167  Under the 
proposed Eco-Labeling Act, the EPA would determine the product 
categories generally eligible for green labeling and set up an eco-
labeling board whose thirteen members would come from the 
government as well as manufacturing, environmental, consumer, 
scientific, and labor groups.168  The board would be responsible for 
accrediting independent certification centers, which in turn would set 
eco-label criteria for specific product categories, audit production 
facilities, and award a federal eco-label to products meeting those 
criteria.169 
A new, government-sponsored certification program along these 
lines would have the advantage of creating a single label under a single 
 
 165.  29 C.F.R. § 1910.7. 
 166.  Eco-Labeling Act of 2008, S., 110th Congress. (2008), available at 
http://standards.nsf.org/apps/group_public/download.php/2802/Eco-Label%20bill%207-22-08.pdf.  
Gwendolyn Bounds, As Eco-Seals Proliferate, So Do Doubts, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2009, available 
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123862823846680371.html. 
 167.  7 C.F.R § Pt. 205. 
 168.  Joe Kamalick, US Eco-Label Mandate on the Table, ICIS CHEMICAL BUSINESS, Oct. 27, 
2008, at 13.  Eco-Labeling Act §§ 3, 5.  Toxic or dangerous products would be ineligible for the 
eco-label, as would products manufactured through processes likely to significantly harm human 
health or the environment. 
 169.  Eco-Labeling Act §§ 6-9; Kamalick, supra note 168, at 13. 
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governance structure.  Unlike a purely government-run program, such a 
scheme would not require the creation of a substantial bureaucracy to 
test and certify products.170  Although the organic label experience 
suggests that such a label could become established fairly rapidly, it is 
worth noting that the European Union’s eco-label program, launched in 
1992, remains relatively unknown among European consumers despite 
substantial publicity.171  Unless potentially competing labels are cleared 
from the field, a completely new government certification may suffer a 
similar fate. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Establishment of environmental advocates within the EPA would 
counter biased rulemaking processes, provide a needed outsider 
perspective, and stimulate more vigorous use of existing regulatory 
authority.  Government sanction of environmental certification systems 
would reduce confusion in green marketing and foster more effective 
consumer participation in the sustainability movement.  These reforms 
are important steps toward shifting environmental decision-making 
power away from powerful economic interests and to the people, where 
it ultimately belongs. 
 
 
 170.  Fliegelman, supra note 103, at 1048. 
 171.  Gertz, supra note 160, at 137-38; Horne, supra note 108, at 176-78.   
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